Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 27

Number 3

Article 7

Spring 1983

Contract Law in Commercial Transactions: An Artifact of
Twentieth Century Business Life?
James J. White
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
James J. White, Contract Law in Commercial Transactions: An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business
Life?, 27 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) - (1983).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol27/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

-

·J:£1(

~!~
1+:;

,!..,.,

--1 ,~ ~'

J~

_,lc;,1l~r·<;.

,:.

nof-

11.,r

~

11

'ii

/1. Q<; t t; S OuJn
for f cJ.r I/ I' l• l ,uf-,

~.'t

(.I')~

/r

I

r1

J 1;,?,,.

I

nd (~~(\~,

CHEMICAL
COMPANY
22

Contract Law in
Modem Comtnercial Transactions:
An Artifact
of Twentieth Century
Business Life?
by James J. White

This article is a somewhat abridged version of the fifth
annual Foulston-Siefkin Lecture which Professor White
delivered at the Washburn University School of Law. The
complete text of the speech was printed in the Washburn
Law Journal, Volume 22, Number 1, Fall 1982.

D

iligent first-year law students study contract law
with a passion previously reserved for romantic
objects and religious idols. Their professors lead
them in extensive and difficult intellectual explorations of the wilds of contract law. There are careful
analyses of why damage recovery X will stimulate
performance Y, why recovery A is appropriate to
encourage the aggrieved party to return to the market, and so on and so forth. Lurking behind this
year-long analysis are several inarticulate hypotheses:
that contracting parties make rational evaluations of
the threat of legal sanctions; that they respond in
other varied and subtle ways to the law's command.
Contracting parties are presented as a microcosm
surrounded by an impermeable membrane, a microcosm always in equilibrium and always responding
to the rules and sanctions of contract doctrine. Of
course, persons in this microcosm violate their contractual obligations but those injured by the
violation are appropriately recompensed by damages
or are protected by specific performance or other
order of the court. Neither the passions of man nor
the effects of fire, flood, war, the demands of the
economy, the harsh pressures of depression, inflation, or shortage cross this membrane. The
microcosm is free of such influences, governed not
by the law of nature or economics but by the law of
contract.
It is my contention that the characterization of contractural relations in the foregoing paragraph is at

best misleading, perhaps downright inaccurate. It is
my thesis that contract law is a much less significant
determinant of commercial behavior in complex
transactions than the typical law student, contracts
professor, or lawyer dares believe.
As evidence, I offer the results of an empirical
study of contract administration in the chemical
industry during a period of widespread shortages. In
1974 and 1975, all the large chemical companies experienced such shortages and allocated many products.
In devising allocations schemes, lawyers for the
chemical companies raised a host of interpretive
questions concerning the applicable law. Section
2-615(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code is the
basic statement of the allocation rules:
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect
only part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must
allocate production and deliveries among his customers
but may at his option include regular customers not then
under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner
which is fair and reasonable.

This suggests that an allocation system need only be
"fair and reasonable," not strictly pro rata. However,
a pro rata distribution scheme does appear to be
the one contemplated by the drafters to be most frequently appropriate. The Comment which expands
on the rules set out in U.C.C. S 2-615(b) further
implies a series of forbidden acts. It states that a
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seller may not make an allocation which "exceeds
normal past requirements," although a company may
receive a higher price from spot customers than from
contract customers. This statement implies that the
seller may not add new customers, although it does
not state that prohibition directly.
The Comment further states that "good faith
requires, when prices have advanced, that the seller
exercise real care in making his allocations, and in
case of doubt his contract customers should be
favored and supplies prorated evenly among them
regardless of price." Thus the Comment forbids the
seller from favoring one buyer over another because
the favored buyer offers a higher price or other
rewards. It is my contention that these rules of law
are weak and relatively insignificant determinants of
behavior. By an examination of contractual behavior I
hope to demonstrate the variety of sirens who compete with law for the contracting parties' loyalty. I do
that in a setting in which the parties' behavior was
in violation of their contractual obligations and was
often known to be so.
My research consisted of interviews with thirty
sales representatives and corporate buyers at ten
companies in the chemical industry. I also administered a questionnaire to each. I started my research
with the conception that each company would have a
written plan which spelled out the allocation concerning each customer and response to each consideration
in intricate detail. My conception could not have
been further from the truth. Of the companies interviewed, none had a written allocation plan or a fixed
plan concerning its products. Although lawyers had
given oral or written advice in every case, most companies had a different and informal plan with respect
to each product. Typically, chemical company sales
staffs are divided according to product line, and specific corporate employees are responsible for sale
and distribution of specific products. The contractual
and practical relations with the buyers of various
products differ from product to product and from
company to company. For example, one company
might sell its entire output of product A to a single
buyer. Another might have hundreds of thousands of
individual buyers for a specific product. A company
might be a sole supplier to a particular buyer. The
buyer might have economically viable substitutes for
the particular product or he might have no substitutes. For all these reasons the allocation plans from
product to product and company to company vary
according to the circumstances.
Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the predominant mode of allocation was a specific form of
pro rata allocation. That mode was to allocate on a
pro rata basis in accordance with actual purchases
over a historic period. If buyer A had purchased one
million pounds last year and buyer B had purchased
500,000 pounds last year, buyer A would receive
twice as large an allocation this year as buyer B. This
would be true even though the contracts of buyers
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A and B contain identical quantity terms. The conventional practice in the chemical industry is to write
contracts that contain minima and maxima. The practice is for the seller to urge the buyer to take as much
of the product as he will but not to insist that the
buyer take even the minimum amount in his contract. This convention is so deeply imbedded that a
contract which would appear normal to a sales lawyer, namely one with a specific quantity in which
both the buyer and the seller expect to deliver that
quantity, is treated as a variant in the chemical
industry. That variant is called a "take or pay" contract, a name that sets it off from the usual contract in
which the seller agrees to deliver up to a certain
amount, but in which he does not insist that the
buyer take the minimum amount. Partly because the
quantities specified in the contracts bore no necessary relationship to the amount the purchaser had
actually taken and paid for in the historic period, or
even any necessary relationship to the buyer's current intention, most sellers allocated not according to
contract amount but according to historic "take."
Allocating according to historic take has a subtle,
and not incidental, consequence. It allows one to
allocate to contract customers and also to "spot" customers who have no contracts. By hypothesis, in
time of shortage, the spot prices will be higher than
the prices in long term contracts; for that reason it
will be in the short-run interest of the seller to sell as
large a percentage of his product to spot buyers as
he can without offending his contract buyers. The
allocation according to historic take and not by contract amounts tends to maximize the sellers' short-run
profits.
Allocation according to contract amount was rare; it
occurred only where special circumstances made it
appear that loyalty to contract buyers was in a company's long-term interest. Allocation according to
geographic region was another form of pro rata allocation which was used in rare circumstances. It is
important to recognize that these various allocation
plans, all based on a form of pro rata distribution,
could produce radically different distributions of particular products. If Section 2-615(b) permits such a
variety of choices, then the se_ller has enormous discretion even within the pro rata rubic. In addition,
companies used a multitude of variations from pro
rata allocation.
Before describing these, I will comment on the
clauses in various chemical companies' contracts
which deal with allocation. As one might expect, the
form contracts of all the companies I studied contained terms that dealt with allocation. Some were no
more than an attempt to restate Section 2-615. Others
were clever and intricate attempts to give the seller
greater discretion in allocation, often in language that
might not disclose to the buyer the full scope of the
seller's intention. Some of the thirty contracts I examined appeared to have been individually negotiated
by the parties.

One would assume in such cases not only the lawyer but also the contract administrators would know
of such clauses and would honor them. Yet no company representative I questioned about allocation
practices referred to a contract clause in answer to
any of my questions about his rights or behavior.
Although some skillful effort by lawyers was invested
in these clauses, I saw little to suggest the contract
administrators knew about or relied upon them in
making their allocation decisions.
Although a pro rata distribution method was the
norm for almost all products in all companies, every
company deviated from its pro rata model in many
ways. Consider first the deviations which are reasoned and clearly justifiable as "fair and reasonable"
under section 2-615. A common case in which seller
gave more than a pro rata share to buyer was that
involving "defense rated" orders under which federal
law would call for a preference to a particular buyer.
A second rationale that would certainly be
regarded as justifying a permissible deviation from
pro rata under a fair and reasonable distribution system is the argurnen t that the alternative· allocation
plan will help a buyer who would otherwise suffer
extraordinary economic injury or that the social cost
would be great if the seller insisted upon a pro rata
distribution method. Several companies reported
they granted more than a pro rata share to certain
buyers who would suffer severe economic consequences if they did not get that share. For example,
one company granted more than the pro rata share of
vitamins to an animal food manufacturer who was
halfway through a six-year cycle to qualify the animal
food under some federal agency standards. Had they
cut off their distribution, the company would have
had to start over and would have lost the several
years that had already passed in the six-year cycle. If
one assumes the seller in such cases did not make
an added increment of profit by favoring the municipality or the animal food company, such a
distribution would be regarded as fair and
reasonable.
In some cases, the buyers' purchases during the
historic period under consideration had been abnormally low. In such cases the seller allocated more
than a pro rata share to such buyers in recognition of
the fact those buyers had an equal claim with those
who had been in operation in the historic period.
A final justifiable deviation from pro rata occurred
in the case of a seller whose total output was historically committed to one neighboring buyer. In such
circumstances neither the buyer, the seller, nor any
other buyer of that particular product could have a
legitimate expectation that any of that product at any
time, whether in short or long supply, would go to
third parties. During a shortage no reasonable expectations would be injured if the entire output of such
a plant were devoted to the traditional buyer.
Because there is a better opportunity for deviousness, a similar allocation where the seller is also the
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started my research with the
conception that each company
would have a written allocation plan.
My conception could not have been
further from the truth.

buyer is more questionable. Since there is no external
restraint and presumably in many cases no external
evidence such as a long-term contract to show the
practice and commitment, the courts should be more
hesitant to accept the argument as a reasoned deviation from pro rata distribution in the latter case than
in the former where there is an external buyer.
The inarticulate premise of section 2-615 is that a
seller should not be free in time of shortage to disregard his long-term commitments and favor shortterm buyers who will pay higher prices. Although it
is clear the seller may treat himself as a customer, he
is forbidden by section 2-615 from giving himself
an additional, unjustified share. Rarely could one justify the addition of new customers under section
2-615 in time of shortage. Discussions with chemical
company lawyers disclosed that they were well aware
of those problems. Some lawyers indicated they were
careful to point out those difficulties to their sellers.
Nevertheless, I received a surprising number of
admissions that sellers had engaged in non-pro rata
distributions which almost certainly were in violation
of section 2-615. In two cases, these admissions were
made in the presence of company lawyers who were
surprised and obviously discomfited by the
admissions.
In the remainder of this article I propose to focus
on those deviations from pro rata allocation not
because I regard them as particularly evil or interesting in their own right, but because they will disclose
something about the limits on the power of the law
to control behavior in a corporate organization. When
one conforms to contractual and statutory obligations,
an observer can never tell whether one did so
because of those obligations or for some other
motive. When one deviates from those obligations, at
minimum we know those obligations were not powerful enough to outweigh the reasons for deviation.
Thus it is only in those cases that we can hope to
learn something about the power of the law to control behavior in this context.
One ·deviation from pro rata allocation which was
widely practiced, probably in violation of section
2-615, was the diversion of an upstream product.
Assume, for example, a seller uses natural gas to produce products A and B, and that in normal times
he uses 50% of his natural gas to produce A and 50%
to produce B. Assume also that in time of shortage
the seller will make larger profits by producing B
25

than A. May he then allocate a larger share of his
natural gas to produce B, thus maximizing his profits? By doing so he expands the pie to be shared
by the buyers of B and shrinks the pie to be shared
by the buyers of A. Several respondents reported
they routinely engaged in such allocations. Some of
them believed these allocations to be justified and
not controlled by section 2-615. They concluded their
only obligation was to make a fair and reasonable
allocation of the amount of A or B manufactured.
Surely this is too narrow a view of section 2-615.
Unless the buyers of A knew of and explicitly or
implicitly agreed to the upstream diversion, I think a
court would not find such a diversion to be justified
under section 2-615.
Second, most of the respondents conceded that
they granted more than a pro rata share to internal
uses. In some cases such deviations would be justified, but it seems likely that most were not. One
respondent stated he allocated only after he had satisfied his own needs. He concluded that his obligation
was to allocate only that part left over after his company had been satisfied. Purchasing managers
interviewed were unanimous in their belief that sellers satisfied their internal demands before they
commenced allocation. A sales representative of one
company was remarkably candid: "We sure as hell
are not going to short our own plant." Moreover, he
indicated that next year he might be working for
the president of the division he had shorted this
year. The implication of his remark was that one's
corporate career might well be inhibited by having
granted less than the full amount to a corporate
superior.
A third deviation from pro rata distribution which
was obviously in violation of section 2-615 was the
saie of products to new customers. Two of the
respondents explicitly and one implicitly stated they
took on new customers in the time of shortage.
Except in extraordinary circumstances, it would be
impossible to justify the addition of new customers
during a shortage under section 2-615. The rationale
for such action was purely economic. As one respondent put it, one should have a right to "salt the
market" because times of shortage were when one
"added to his market share." He indicated they
might serve a new customer where in prior times
they "never got beyond the lobby." Such motivation
is understandable, but it is not the kind of motivation the cases or the statute would recognize as
reasonable and justified.
Finally, all the respondents admitted granting more
than a pro rata share to certain buyers for reason&
which probably could not be defended under section
2-615. For example, two companies acknowledged
they granted greater than pro rata shares to particularly good customers.
Most companies reported that they "swapped,"
i.e., engaged in barter transactions. Although no
company stated it got an additional share by swap26

ping, it is hard to conceive a reason for swapping
except to gain an additional share. Barter transactions
are cumbersome and are the rare exception in a modem economy. The only justification for engaging in
such transactions is the thought that by granting
another person a product in short supply, one gives
him a higher price and thus encourages him to
return the favor in the form of a disproportionate
share of his shortage product. It is my hypothesis the
swaps were StiJimlated by an interest in gaining
more than a pro rata share of a particular seller's distribution and that in fact they were executed
principally for that purpose.
By comparing the various buyers' and sellers' allocation behavior with the law and by examining
sellers' motives one can attempt to measure the influence of section 2-615 and contract obligations on
these particular sellers. Let us tum to that task.
What can one learn from the foregoing? It seems
certain many of the sellers failed to conform to their
contractual and statutory obligations. Had all the
facts been known and brought to the attention of a
court, many sellers would have had to pay at least
nominal damages. Why was the law insufficient to
the task? By analyzing the foregoing rules of law and
the behavior of the sellers, one can demonstrate that
the rules of law cast only a pale light upon the landscape of commercial contract administration and that
that light is insufficient to hold at bay a variety of
wolves and harpies who threaten the typical contract
administrator.
First, one must understand why the law's power is
so slight. To begin with, the law passes through the
filter of vague language. Section 2-615 says only that
one must allocate in a fair and reasonable manner.
When one applies that exhortation to the complex
and varied fact patterns seen even in a single industry, the difficulty of stating certain rules becomes
apparent. Who can say with confidence, for example,
that the allocation of an upstream product such as
natural gas to diminish the downstream product is
an unreasonable or irrational allocation method and
in violation of section 2-615? One will search in vain
for cases on that point. Even assuming it was done to
maximize the seller's profits in apparent violation of
the policy of section 2-615, one might justify such an
allocation on the basis that everyone in the chemical
trade expects such a thing to be done and 'thus it is
not a violation of any buyer's legitimate expectations.
At the outset, .vagueness of the law, combined with
the complexity of the fact patterns, means even some
who are intelligent, diligent, and well meaning will
be mistaken about the law's command in a variety
of circumstances.
Because the law's command must be executed not
by lawyers but ultimately by lay corporate agents, the
problem is compounded. I doubt that any of the lay
respondents had read even a single case concerning
allocation. Few of them knew of the existence of section 2-615 and hardly more than a few had any

familiarity with the Code. Thus, each layman had to
depend upon his lawyer to apply the law to the particular facts and give direction.
A comparison of the ways in which companies
went about that task is informative. One company
conducted a slide show in which a lawyer presented
a text together with a variety of slides entitled "Can
We Tilt?" In other companies the lawyers gave written memoranda to particular persons in answer to
specific questions. Nearly all the lawyers had given
oral advice to various sales representatives. It should
be clear if lawyers are simply responding to questions of the lay seller, the seller has only a small
chance of discovering how the law would apply in
his particular case. By hypothesis the layman is ignorant of the law. That ignorance alone may foreclose
him from asking for the necessary legal assistance.
Thus, the light of the law, already faint, must pass
through a second filter. The lay actor, a corporate
seller, must appreciate his ignorance, seek advice,
and apply that advice to his own complex facts.
A third filter is a function of the way in which
information about legal responsibilities is transmitted
within a corporate organization. Without exception,
the lawyers are staff personnel rather than supervisors of those who make the selling decisions.
Lawyers are not in the operational chain of command. They are likely to come from "headquarters,"
render advice, and return to headquarters. Only in
the remotest sense do their careers depend upon the
profitability of the various divisions of the company.
The laymen in charge of contract administration may
listen respectfully to the lawyer's description of the
law, but they will listen even more carefully to their
supervisor's instruction about profitability, sales, and
performance. One suspects even when the law shines
brightly from the lawyer, that brilliance is over-powered by a greater light from the superior. Superiors
may conclude that the lawyer's advice conflicts with
their divisions' interest. They may find it inviting
to seize upon any equivocation in the lawyer's directive or convenient to distort that advice to conform
to their conception of their economic interest.
For these three reasons, as well as others, the law's
power is significantly diminished by the time it
reaches the line contract administrator. Its meaning is
uncertain as it is applied to complex facts. Its meaning may be diluted and distorted by its inefficient
transmission from the lawyer to the layman. Its
power is further diminished because the one transmitting does not supervise the decision maker.
In discussing the foregoing factors we have
assumed a person who, if informed, was generally
willing to comply with the law. What of those who
are not willing to comply with it and see the law
to be so thoroughly in conflict with their economic
interests that they do not wish to follow it? It is for
those that we have sanctions, injunctions, orders for
specific performance, consequential, and other damages. Doubtless in some circumstances the prosp,~ct
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found considerable evidence
that lawyers were diligent in
advising their clients but found little
evidence that any company changed
its behavior in response to the law.

of such sanctions has an important impact upon parties to a contract. Consider three reasons which
demonstrate why that is almost certainly not true in
the chemical industry.
First, the complexity associated with the performance of the typical chemical contract renders it
unlikely any party will find out or be able to prove
that another has not complied with the allocation
rules. Based on the respondent's reports, I discovered
various sellers favored themselves, particular customers, or added new customers. Only by
happenstance or through very expensive investigation could one ferret out such information from an
uncooperative seller. Consider a large chemical company that sells hundreds of products to thousands
of buyers. Remember that section 2-615 does not
demand that all sales be on a pro rata basis, only that
they be fair and reasonable. How then does a company prove that as a recipient of product X, it has
received less than its share because there has been an
unfair and unreasonable allocation of product X to
another firm? Absent a gross deviation from a pro
rata allocation, one would have difficulty proving
such distribution. Only the prospect of a large payoff would justify the expense necessary to prove such
a fact.
Second, the relationship between the buyers and
sellers in the chemical industry mitigates against
lawsuits. None of the respondents reported any significant lawsuits. Several had received threats of
suits; one or two had been sued in minor matters,
but none had been involved in major litigation
related to contract claims on shortage products. Part
of the reason is the cost one incurs in undertaking
such litigation. If a seller allocates some part of the
product and one is able to continue production with
that allocation, albeit less efficiently and less profitably than with a larger amount, one runs the risk of
forfeiting that share by commencing a lawsuit. Not
only does one run the risk of forfeiting that amount,
one also risks interfering with tens or perhaps dozens
of sales and purchases of other products from and to
the other potential litigant. Because chemical companies buy from and sell to other chemical companies
on a large-scale basis, the disruption of all those
transactions may well be more expensive than the
expected pay-off_ ai;i_sing from a lawsuit.
The final and related factor which inhibits litigation
27

is the kind of injury suffered by one who is receiving
a modest but unjustifiably reduced allocation. By
hypothesis that party is not suffering the kind of catastrophic injuries which occur when one cancels a
long-term supply contract as Westinghouse did with
its uranium contracts or when a large and expensive
product fails and causes millions of dollars of economic loss. Rather, the plaintiff is likely to suffer
some significant but less than catastrophic loss in
profits. Thus, when making the calculation described
in the foregoing paragraph and weighing the
expected return of a lawsuit against the likely disruption of the business relationship, a buyer will
probably decide against the lawsuit.
Yet this is only part of the puzzle. The law is weak
not only because it is poorly transmitted through
various filters to reach our hypothetical contract
administrator but also because its sanctions are distant and unlikely to be suffered. Its weakness is
magnified because it must compete with a series of
conflicting motivations. Corporate employees must
serve the company's selfish interests; they must also
serve their own selfish interests. That the legal obligation will conflict with the selfish interest in
commonplace; presumably that is why we have contract sanctions. My study shows the motivation of the
contract administrator is more complex than one
might think.
Contract administrators have to protect their own
interests. Even if it might be in the long-range interest of the company to follow the law, even if the
company's profits might be maximized by doing so,
a contract administrator may choose to violate the
rules of Section 2-615 and decide, for example, to
allocate to an internal use because such a diversion
appears personally advantageous. Ideally, of course, a
company should construct its incentives so that personal goals of the employees do not conflict with
the corporate goals. I doubt such an ideal corporation
exists, and certainly in this case it is easy to hypothesize a situation in which an employee might choose
to violate the rules of Section 2-615 to speed personal
advancement.
Also important are the contract administrators'
relationships with persons associated with the buying companies. Contract administrators repeatedly
reported that they gained more than they otherwise
would have, or expected to receive additional orders
after the shortage was over, because of their particular
relationship with persons in the buying or selling
departments of other companies. They reported that
these benefits would last only as long as the same
personnel were in those organizations and they had
varying opinions about how long such benefits were
likely to survive a shortage period. It was obvious
their personal and moral obligations to persons in
those companies would influence their pattern of
purchases both during and after the shortage.
After one has examined barriers to the law's reach
and has observed the manifold pressures to escape
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even its weakened grasp, one wonders if the law has
any effect at all on contract administration in a shortage. The respondents confessed a variety of behavior
that was in violation of section 2-615 and the cases.
Yet none of them reported any significant legal challenge from a party who might have been injured
by their deviation from the law's dictates.
Even when the parties conformed to the rules of
section 2-615, their conformity may not have been
dictated by the rules of law but by _intelligent selfinterest. Pro rata allocation based on historic take is
probably a sensible economic compromise between
one's long- and short-term interests. I saw no evidence such an allocation method was adopted
because the law of contracts called for it.
If the law was incapable of shaping these contract
administrators' behavior, are we to conclude it is
truly an artifact of twentieth century commercial life,
an external substance of no significance to the economic life of these companies? The results fall far
short of proving that, yet they do not conflict with
that idea. I found considerable evidence that lawyers
were diligent in attempting to interpret the law and
careful to advise their clients but found little evidence there was any significant change in any
company's behavior in response to the law.
If one assumes for the moment that my hypothesis
is correct, namely, that the law is in fact irrelevant
in determining the behavior of chemical companies
during allocations, what can one conclude about
commercial contract law in other areas? Are we to
conclude that buyers' and sellers' behavior in contract
formation, in contract modification, in determining
whether to take actions that might be regarded as
breach of contract are all taken in ignorance of or
without regard for the law? Of course that is not true.
Obviously, when there are millions of dollars at
stake, when the risks and costs are very high, any
sensible businessman will consult his lawyer.
Yet corporate lawyers, law teachers, and students
might well be surprised by the implications of my
study of allocation. My findings are compatible with
the idea that many corporate acts which accord with
the law, as well as those which do not, are taken in
ignorance or disregard of it.
How should we shape our behavior in response to
that learning? It will confirm house counsels' darkest
fears about their clients' disregard for their advice.
It will demand a search for new ways to make one's
client listen and conform. For the legislator and
judge, it will call for more humility. The lawmakers
must be more willing to make the law conform to the
sensible practices of business and to accept the fact
that the law is incapable of changing those practices
except at greatcost. For teachers of contracts, it
means acceptance of a diminished role. If our students are truly to understand contracting parties'
behavior, perhaps we must integrate our contract
teaching more fully with the conflicting currents of
commercial life.

